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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2660 
___________ 
 
FREDERICK STAMPONE, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MATTHEW WALKER, Director of Operations; NEW 
YORK CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS; NORTHEAST 
CARPENTERS FUNDS; GEORGE LAUFENBERG, Manager; NEW YORK 
CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS BENEFIT FUNDS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-06956) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 4, 2017 
Before:  JORDAN, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 8, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Frederick Stampone appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
Third Amended Complaint.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings.  
I. 
 Stampone is a member of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and the New 
York City District Council of Carpenters, and he has participated in their pension benefit 
plans.  He also has been a Certified Carpenter Steward.  Stampone brought this civil 
action and ultimately filed a Third Amended Complaint against two groups of 
defendants, which we will refer to as the Pension Defendants and the Union Defendants.1  
Stampone asserted numerous claims, but they are based on two underlying allegations. 
 First, Stampone claims that the Pension Defendants have miscalculated his 
pension benefits.  Stampone initially claimed that the Pension Defendants wrongfully 
advised him that he was ineligible for benefits because they had not vested.  During this 
litigation, however, the Pension Defendants acknowledged that such advice resulted from 
an administrative error.  They also advised Stampone of the pension payments he could 
expect and provided him with application forms to begin receiving them.  Stampone, 
however, claims that the Pension Defendants have miscalculated his benefits and that he  
                                              
1 The Pension Defendants are the Northeast Carpenters Funds, its manager George 
Laufenberg, and the New York City District Council of Carpenters Benefits Funds.  The 
Union Defendants are the New York City District Council of Carpenters and its Director 
of Operations, Matthew Walker.  We refer to these two groups of defendants collectively 
for ease of reference and without suggesting that any particular defendant is responsible 
for any of the particular conduct alleged. 
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cannot retire (and thus cannot take his pension) unless the Pension Defendants will pay  
what he believes is the proper amount. 
 Second, Stampone claims that the Union Defendants wrongfully suspended his 
certification as a Steward for four months and that he lost employment opportunities as a 
result.  Stampone further claims that they did so because he did not attend a meeting of 
which he was not notified and without giving him an opportunity to be heard. 
On defendants’ motions, the District Court dismissed Stampone’s Third Amended 
Complaint with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The District Court construed 
Stampone’s claim regarding his pension as arising in part under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), and it dismissed the claim to that extent on the ground 
that Stampone failed to plead that he exhausted his administrative remedies.  The District 
Court also construed Stampone’s claims regarding suspension of his Steward certification 
as arising in part under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and in part 
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”).  It dismissed 
Stampone’s LMRA claim on the ground that he did not allege that the Union Defendants 
breached any provision of any governing document, and it dismissed his LMRDA claim 
on the ground that his status as a Steward was not protected under that Act.  The District 
Court also dismissed Stampone’s numerous other claims.  Stampone appeals.2 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Stampone states in his notice of appeal 
that he is appealing “all” of the District Court’s orders, but he challenges only the 
dismissal of his claims and we thus need only address the dismissal of his Third 
Amended Complaint.  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
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II. 
 We will vacate and remand for further proceedings on Stampone’s ERISA claim 
but will affirm the District Court’s judgment in all other respects. 
A.     Stampone’s ERISA Claim 
 ERISA allows a plan participant to bring a civil action to “recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to 
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B).  ERISA does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, but courts 
generally will not entertain claims seeking benefits under an ERISA plan unless the 
plaintiff first exhausts administrative remedies available under the plan or shows that 
such exhaustion would be futile.  See Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 
244, 249 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 In this case, the District Court dismissed Stampone’s ERISA claim on the sole 
ground that he failed to plead exhaustion.  On appeal, the Pension Defendants likewise 
defend the dismissal of this claim on that sole ground.  Neither the District Court nor the 
Pension Defendants, however, have cited any authority requiring a plaintiff to plead 
exhaustion in his or her complaint.  To the contrary, all of the decision on which they rely 
addressed exhaustion at the summary judgment stage.  See, e.g., id. at 247. 
                                              
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
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 We have not addressed whether an ERISA plaintiff must plead exhaustion in the  
complaint.  There may be sound reasons for concluding that an ERISA plaintiff need not 
do so.3  We need not decide the issue in this case, however, because dismissal for lack  
of exhaustion appears otherwise premature under the circumstances presented here.  In 
support of their motions to dismiss, the Pension Defendants submitted affidavits and 
other evidence regarding their efforts to resolve Stampone’s claims about his pension.  
The District Court did not expressly consider that evidence, and it likely could not 
properly have considered at least some of it at the pleading stage.   
We note, however, that the Pension Defendants’ evidence and argument focused 
largely on the fact that Stampone had not completed an application for benefits for which 
they first deemed him eligible during this litigation.  (ECF Nos. 73-8 at 22-35; 75-1 at 12-
14.)  And Stampone’s claim is that the Pension Defendants have miscalculated his 
                                              
3 We have recognized that ERISA exhaustion is an affirmative defense, see Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 280, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2007), and plaintiffs generally need 
not plead facts overcoming an affirmative defense, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-
13 (2007).  For that reason, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs asserting claims 
that are governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) need not plead 
satisfaction of the PLRA’s statutory exhaustion requirement.  See id. at 216.  The same 
arguably should be all the more true for plaintiffs asserting claims under ERISA, which 
does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement.  Cf. Paese v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 435, 445 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he fact that ERISA, 
unlike the PLRA, does not even contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, further 
strengthens our conclusion” that ERISA exhaustion is not jurisdictional).  Of course, even 
if a plaintiff need not plead ERISA exhaustion, a complaint may still be subject to 
dismissal if lack of exhaustion is apparent on its face.  See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16.  In 
this case, however, Stampone did not plead facts affirmatively ruling out the possibility 
of exhaustion. 
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benefits and that he cannot retire (and thus cannot take his pension) unless defendants pay 
him what he believes is the proper amount.  The District Court did not specifically 
address exhaustion of that claim and, in light of all the foregoing, we believe that its 
resolution at the pleading stage is premature.  Thus, we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings on Stampone’s ERISA claim regarding his pension.  On remand, the 
District Court may wish to conduct proceedings limited to the questions of whether 
Stampone has exhausted this claim and, if not, whether exhaustion would be futile.   
B.     Stampone’s Remaining Claims 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Stampone’s remaining claims 
largely for the reasons it explained.4  We separately address three issues.   
First, the District Court properly construed Stampone’s claim regarding the 
suspension of his Steward certification as arising in part under the LMRA, which gives 
Union members the right to sue for breach of Union constitutions, by-laws, and other 
governing documents.  See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 101 (1991).  We agree with the District Court that Stampone also 
failed to allege a plausible claim.  Stampone’s sole allegation in this regard, in the fourth 
iteration of his complaint, was that “nowhere is it stated” in the Union constitution or by-
                                              
4 The District Court dismissed several of Stampone’s other claims for failure to exhaust 
as well but, unlike with the ERISA claim just discussed, the District Court also concluded 
that Stampone otherwise failed to state plausible claims on the merits.  We agree with the 
District Court’s rulings on the merits and thus need not address exhaustion of Stampone’s 
other claims. 
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laws that Steward certification can be suspended or a member “found guilty” for not 
attending a meeting.  (ECF No. 72 at 6.)  As the District Court explained, Stampone did 
not claim that defendants’ conduct breached any particular provision of these documents.  
Stampone also did not attach them or otherwise plead anything suggesting that they 
prohibit the specific conduct alleged here. 
Second, the District Court also properly construed this claim as arising in part 
under the LMRDA.  That statute provides in relevant part that, in the absence of certain 
due process protections, union members may not be “fined, suspended, expelled, or 
otherwise disciplined” except on grounds not relevant here.  29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).  
Stampone does not allege that the Union Defendants suspended his union membership, 
and the District Court properly concluded that their suspension of his Steward 
certification did not constitute “discipline” under this statute because it did not concern 
his union membership.  See United Steel Workers Local 12-369 v. United Steel Workers 
Int’l, 728 F.3d 1107, 1117 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 
438 & n.9 (1982)).5 
 Third, Stampone—who appears to have been 64 years old when he filed his Third 
Amended Complaint—asserted that defendants’ alleged conduct constituted 
                                              
5 We note that such a suspension might constitute “discipline” for purposes of another 
provision of the LMRDA that is not at issue here.  See Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 
193-94 (3d Cir. 2004).  That provision prohibits the “discipline” of union members for 
exercising the rights of free speech and assembly conferred by 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).  
See 29 U.S.C. § 529.  Stampone has alleged nothing implicating that provision. 
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discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).  The 
District Court properly dismissed his claim to the extent that it failed to raise a plausible 
inference of discrimination against Stampone personally, but it did not address a separate 
aspect of his claim.  Stampone claims that defendants’ pension plan is discriminatory 
because it permits members who are over 65 years old to work as carpenters in other 
states without penalty but penalizes workers who are between 62 and 65 years old for 
doing the same.  In other words, Stampone claims that the plan is discriminatory because 
it treats a class of older workers more favorably than a class of younger workers.  This 
claim fails as a matter of law because the ADEA, unlike some other anti-discrimination 
statutes, does not prohibit “reverse discrimination” and thus does not prohibit treating 
older workers more favorably than younger ones.  See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584, 600 (2004). 
III. 
  For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment to the extent that it 
dismissed Stampone’s ERISA claim regarding his pension benefits but will affirm in all 
other respects.  We emphasize the narrow scope of our remand.  Stampone likens this 
case to one he references as “Hulk Hogan v. Gawker,” and he has demanded $100 
million in damages.  This case is not of that magnitude.  Instead, with our rulings, this 
case presents a simple dispute over the calculation of Stampone’s pension benefits.  We 
express no opinion on whether Stampone has exhausted his ERISA claim regarding his 
pension, on the merits of that claim, or on whether Stampone would be entitled to any 
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damages if he were to prevail.  Stampone, however, should bear in mind the limited 
nature of this case on remand. 
